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PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION IN IMPERIAL 
AND CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
by Arthur F, Wright 
I begin with a quotation from Ross Terrill, a recent journalist-traveler to 
China: 
Though force remains the ultimate basis of any state, control of the people in Chrna 
is more nearly psychological than by physical coercion. Its extent would be hard to 
overstate. 
The first question which will engage us is this: Have the Chinese as a people 
been traditionally more susceptible than other peopIe to psychoIogica1 mech- 
anisms of control by their rulers? And if I can show that they have, the second 
question presents itself: Is this true of contemporary China? If I can show 
that the answer to the second question is affirmative, then we shall have 
isolated one characteristic of imperial China that continues to affect public 
and private behavior under a Communist government.' 
China specialists have been grappling with the relationship between the 
imperial order and that of the People's Republic ever since 1950. Not onIy 
have we tried out innumerable hypotheses, often with inadequate data; we 
also have had to do so in a hostile climate of opinion where gross simplifica- 
tions of striking absurdity commanded public attention. I give you two exam- 
ples: "Mao Tse-tung is just founding another dynasty," and Dean Rusk's 
characterization of the People's Republic of China in the 1950s as a "Slavic 
Manchukuo." HopefulIy such absurdities are a thing of the past. The China 
specialists are older, sadder, perhaps less ambitious for comprehensive answers 
to the question of new China's relation to the old. We are content to establish 
continuities of specific traditions-specific strands of culture, habit, beha- 
vior-from the imperial order into the new China. I choose one of these 
strands as the theme of this essay. Before turning to the evidence in the case 
we are considering, let me say a few things about China as a whole which 
set the stage, and, in setting the stage, bear directly on our theme. 
We begin with the geographical fact that the Chinese empire was sub-con- 
tinental in extent, covering latitudes the equivalent of Maine to Cuba and 
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longitudes the equivalent of New York to Oregon. That this empire, growing 
in extent and population over a period of 2100 years, survived-with longer 
and Ionger periods of uninterrupted unity-is one of the miracles of human 
history. For the empire was far too large and diverse in climate and customs, 
far too broken up by great river systems, lakes, and mountain ranges to be 
held together by the intensive use of force. Garrisons at all the fifteen hundred 
or two thousand walled cities that were the centers of administration could 
not have held the empire together in the absence of consent. The oft-quoted 
remark of a Confucian to the founder of the Han Dynasty, ca. 206 B.C., has 
become a proverbial way of making this obvious point: "Your majesty may 
have conquered the empire on horseback, but can you indeed rule it on 
horseback?"' 
The system that was developed for governing the empire became, over the 
centuries, very sophisticated. But if we look for its essentials we find them 
in an alliance between a hereditary ruler whose dynasty was invariably estab- 
lished by force, and a literate landed elite. The emperor relied on the literate 
elite for the ideas, the symbols, the skills necessary to maintain social har- 
mony. And the elite relied on the emperor to govern in such a way as to 
protect their interests and to use force whenever necessary against attack from 
outside or armed dissidence within. It was not the emperors but the literate 
elite who rationalized this division of power and developed the system of 
morality which they spread throughout the land, where it served as a common 
system ofvalues, a socia1 cement for the society as a whole. This system, which 
I call imperial Confucianism, was a variegated and flexible system, resilient 
yet durable. I do not want to describe the system as a whole but rather to 
point to certain of its tenets that are clearly connected with our central theme 
of social control by indoctrination and persuasion. 
Perhaps the most fundamental of these tenets of imperial Confucianism 
is the belief that man could, by the teaching and example of his moral superi- 
ors, be changed for the better. This is reiterated in the Chinese Classics, graven 
on countless stones commemorating the founding of schools, expressed in 
prose and poetry and in the epitaphs ofnotable men. A second fundamental 
tenet is that ideally the social order should be an ordered hierarchy with those 
above treating those below with benevolence and those below responding 
with obedience and acceptance of their lot. A woman, for example, was 
expected, in the course of her life, to follow three patterns of submission: 
in youth to submit to her parents; in maturity to submit to her husband; and 
in old age to submit to the wishes of her son. A third belief was in what we 
might call the familial model or pattern for all human arrangements. To 
learn and practice the way of filial duty and submissiveness, it was main- 
tained, qualifies one, in the public sphere, to serve his prince with loyalty. 
Officials were often referred to as "fathers and mothers" of the people under 
their jurisdiction, and the emperors were spoken of as "emperor-fathers" of 
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their subjects. The net effect of this constellation of tenets (and of other basic 
attitudes I have not mentioned) was profoundly conservative. Imperial Con- 
fucianism tended to subordinate the individual to the family, to perpetuate 
time-honored ways and respect both for the aged and for the past, to exalt 
social harmony at all costs. We should keep this general picture of imperial 
Confucianism in mind when we come to consider patterns of propaganda 
and persuasion. 
First I will discuss another cultural factor which bears on our theme: 
language. I assume there is no way of assigning different specific gravities 
to words-especially written words-as these figure in different cultures. But 
if there were, I believe that the weight of the written word-its assumed effi- 
cacy in affecting events-would be greater in Chinese civilization than in 
others. The obvious reasons for this are briefly stated. A single symbol system 
has been in continuous use for more than 3,500 years. The written symbols 
were viewed with awe (as indeed they were in many early societies) because 
they were thought to evoke the potency of whatever they denominated. Some 
of this attitude carried over into the culture of imperial China, where the 
mass of illiterates looked up to the tiny elite above them-an elite differen- 
tiated by its mastery of the written word. Further, the individual symbols did 
not change; they (particularly those with value connotations) accumulated 
with the passage of time a tremendous weight of contextuaI reference and 
allusive meaning. It was the solemn obligation of the ruler to confer appro- 
priate and auspicious names, and we find, in the early months of any new 
dynasty, innumerable decrees giving new names to things. A respected classic 
of imperial Confucianism speaks of the Yellow Emperor (the mythological 
founder of the Chinese order), and it says: "TheYellow Emperor gave correct 
names to the myriad things and thereby enlightened the people as to the 
sharing of  resource^."^ Thus the respect for words, the belief in their power, 
is something quite different from what we find in the Western world. The 
line from Romeo and Juliet, "What's in a name? A rose by any other name 
would smell as sweet," would have seemed the most arrant nonsense to almost 
anyone in imperial China. 
The first communications I shall consider are the formal communications 
from the emperor to his subjects. How was this done, what was the "target 
audience" and what effects were expected? Imperial edicts are by far the most 
common writings in this group, and thousands upon thousands of them sur- 
vive. In China's middle ages (which are my special interest), imperial edicts 
were handled as follows: they were drafted in response to the emperor's 
wishes; when approved they were read in a stentorian voice by an official 
from the gate tower in the center of the south wall of the palace compound; 
officials and residents of the capital might be gathered below and thus hear 
the edict at first hand. But the people thus affected were only a fraction of 
the population. The edict was therefore copied and sent by fast imperial post 
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(using horses in relays) to all the prefectures of the vast empire. And how 
was the edict then brought to the attention of the people? Fortunately we 
have an eyewitness account written by a ninth-century Japanese traveler who 
gives full details: 
An Imperial Edict by the new Emperor has arrived from the capltal. Two carpets 
were spread In the courtyard in front of the gate of the official residence inside the 
city walls. and above the steps on the north slde of the great gate was placed a stand, 
on which wasspread a purple cloth, and on t h ~ s  was placed the Imperial Edict, written 
on yellow paper. The Administrative Officers and Secretaries of the prefecture . . . 
the mllitary officials, the common people, and the monks, nuns, and Taoist priests 
stood in ranks according to their posts on the east side of the court facing west. The 
Magistrate emerged from his residence, preceded by twenty military officers, ten each 
leadlng the way on the left and the right. When the Secretarles, the subprefectural 
officials, and the others saw the Magistrate come out, they bowed thelr heads almost 
to the ground. 
The Magistrate calIed out, "The common people," and they chanted a response 
all together. The Magistrate stood on one of the carpets and an Admlnlstrative Officer 
stood on the other, both of them facing west (the direction of theT'ang capltal). Then 
a military officer called out the t~tles of the various officials, and the row of Secretarles 
and subprefectural officials chanted their response In unison. Next he called out to 
the row of Military Guard Officers, Generals, and Commissioners of Troops, and 
the row of mllltary men chanted their response m unison. He also said, "The various 
guests," and the officlal guests and cllents chanted their response together. Then he  
said, "The monks and Taoist priests," and the monks, nuns, and Taoist prlests chanted 
thelr response all together. 
Next, two military officers brought the stand with the Imperial Edict and placed 
it in front of the Magistrate, who bowed once and then plcked up  the Imperial Edtct 
in his hand and lowered his head, touching it to his forehead. A milttary officer knelt 
and recelved the Imperlal Edlct on his sleeve and, holding it up, went into the court- 
yard and, standlng facing north, chanted, "An Imperial order has arrived." The 
magstrate, Administrative Officers, Secretarles, and the mllitary, all together bowed 
again. A military officer called out, "Let the common people bow," and the people 
bowed again, but the monks, nuns, and Taoist priests dld not bow. . . .Two  . . . Assis- 
tant Judges read the Edlct alternating with each other. Their voices were loud, as 
when government decisions are announced in our country (i.e., Japan). The Imperlal 
Edict was some four or five sheets of paper long, and it took quite a long time to 
read, while no one sat down.. . . Finally, a military officer called out, "You may 
leave," and they all chanted their re$ponse in unison. The officials, the military, the 
monks and Taoist priests, and the common people thereupon dispersed.' 
It would seem from this example that the edict was listened to with awe and 
respect. In later periods, imperial edicts were simply posted at a conspicuous 
point outside the local government office. Generally speaking, edicts transmit 
the day-to-day policy decisions of the emperor and his high officials to the 
populace. They cover the whole range of things from the momentous procla- 
mation of a new dynasty or an empire-wide amnesty down to the regulation 
of minor matters such as the marketing of Buddhist images or the local obser- 
vances of the death anniversary of a member of the imperial house. But, 
whatever their subject, they were the law and they were binding on all. 
PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION i J  
But let us turn to other means by which the emperors sought the consent 
of their subjects and their acceptance of the status quo. One of the most 
important was the establishment of an empire-wide system of schools in 
which a standard curriculum was taught. Most of the learning was memoriza- 
tion, and the texts memorized drummed into the eyes and ears of the young 
the values of imperial Confucianisn~, such things as the five constant virtues: 
benevolence, righteousness, decorum, understanding, and faithfulness. In 
many periods, local governments had a special commissioner of education 
appointed from the capital; he supervised the schools, awarded public recog- 
nition and prizes to particularly apt pupils. Whenever a locality was fortunate 
enough to have a successful candidate in the imperial civiI service examina- 
tions, his return home was the occasion for great public celebration: a banquet 
at the magistrate's expense to which the local aged and notables were invited, 
the awarding of prizes and, in some cases, the erection in the town of a festive 
arch with high-sounding words suited to the occasion. Thus thc whole system, 
with its public recognition-as well as rewards-at the end was superbly cal- 
culated to keep young people at their books and conforming to the accepted 
social norms of imperial Confucianism. 
But in times of stress, for example during the consolidation of a new 
dynasty or when a dynasty's power was threatened, special measures of all 
kinds were devised. One emperor of two thousand years ago was uncertain 
of his dynasty's hoId on power. He ordered that a set of moral injunctions 
he had written for his own sons should be added to the curriculum of all 
schools-thus elevating himself to the level of those sages who had written 
the Classics already being memorized.' Nearly fifteen hundred years later 
the founder of the Ming dynasty-a harsh and despotic ruler-expressed dis- 
appointment that, for all the laws and ordinances promulgated by imperial 
edict, the number of criminals was still enormous. He then went on to 
announce that he himself had written a Ta-kao, or "Great Announcement," 
"to be made known to the people, to enable them to know the ways of pursu- 
ing good fortune and avoiding calamity." Actually written by the emperor, 
the Ta-kao was intended to acquaint people-not just officials-throughout 
his vast empire with the harsh Iaws that were to guide their lives. It was 
circulated among officials and commoners alike; special masters were 
appointed to teach it in village schools. Article 74 states an unusual proviso: 
We have issued this announcement to make perfectly clear the roots of fortune and 
misfortune Among all the officials and among the common people, if in their house- 
holds they have a copy of thls book and if they are convicted of a crime citlling for 
the bastinado or  for ban~shment, they may have thelr sentences reduced one degree 
of punishment per crime. If they don't have a copy, then sentence IS to be r a sed  
one degree per crime. . . .' 
By the time this was issued, 1397, printing had long been in use and literacy 
was far more widespread than in earlier times. These developments made 
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it possible for an emperor to demand that his people actuallypossess his book 
of rules and in some cases be able to read and memorize it. These conditions 
prevailed under the last two dynasties of imperial China, 1369-1912, during 
which time there was also a vast increase in population and a steadily rising 
state budget. All this made possible measures of propaganda and indoctrina- 
tion on a scale unknown in earlier periods. 
Let me illustrate: In 1670 the K'ang-hsi emperor promulgated the "Sacred 
Edict" (Sheng-yii), an elaborate set of moral maxims drawn from imperial 
Confucianism. The edict of promulgation decreed that a lecturer was to be 
appointed in every locality to be assisted by three or four "honest and prudent 
persons," that lectures on the edict were to be given semi-monthly at fixed 
locations, that all school children in the empire were to attend the lectures 
and memorize the edict. It was further decreed that no one, no matter what 
his other qualifications, could take the civil service examinations unless he 
could write the text of the Sacred Edict from memory. The system of lectures 
had, to say the least, uneven results, but it was vigorously revived in the late 
nineteenth century in an effort to restore social morale. Even at that late date, 
new ways of indoctrinating the people withthese maxims of approved moral- 
ity were tried. Lecturers were ordered to use locaI dialects to ensure that 
people understood; exposition of the maxims was made part of the opening 
ceremony for rural markets; roadside lectures were attempted in some areas. 
With the help of the local gentry, meeting halls were built where the Sacred 
Edict was kept and lectures regularly held. And the T'ung-chih Emperor who 
reigned 1862-1874 and presided over the last effort to make the old imperial 
machinery work in the face of threats from within and without, expressed 
his conviction that the "deterioration of the people's hearts and customs" 
during the mid-century was because of the local officials' neglect of the system 
of lectures on the Sacred Edict.' 
In what I have said thus far, I have drawn on only some of the devices 
which the established order used to elicit consent. There is a whole range 
of other devices that were used by rebels: manifestoes, a wide variety of 
slogans promising more land and a better day, liturgies intoned to generate 
self-confidence within a rebel band-all these and many more. Underlying 
both were certain attitudes and beliefs which persisted down the centuries. 
To conclude this section on imperial China let me itemize these attitudes, 
whose workings I have to some extent illustrated: 
1. Respect for the written word. 
2. The belief that certain collections of words, Classics or creeds, if made 
known by teachers in the school or-in shortened form-by slogans or popular 
rhymes, would effect a desired change in people's behavior. 
3. Respect for the authority of such statements, whether issued by the 
established order or by rebel leaders. 
4. The conviction that memorization was the most effective means of get- 
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ting people fully indoctrinated with the desired moral outlook or set of reac- 
tions. 
5. The belief in examples-whether men in the flesh or paragons in 
books-as having real force in effecting desired changes in behavior. 
With this summary itemization, let us turn from imperial China to the 
People's Republic and see whether evidence for the persistence of such basic 
attitudes can be found. 
The formal level of communicating decisions of the leadership to the public 
is infinitely more sophisticated than it was in imperial China, but similar 
assumptions underlie it: that the leadership speaks with unquestionable 
authority and that the populace must acquiesce in the orders that are given 
it. The nationwide network of Party units takes decisions which appear in 
the official newspapers or on the official radio (there are no others) and 
translates them into working terms in all the rural villages and in all the wards 
of the cities. Thus theoretically no one can escape orders given by the leader- 
ship, and in fact almost no one does. At the same time regional and local 
Party leaders have the latitude to present such orders in locally familiar terms 
and by reference to the local situation. Cracks appeared in this system during 
the Cultural Revolution, but it is now fairly well reconstituted with soldiers 
of the People's Liberation Army sharing power and responsibility with Party 
cadres. 
The nationwide network of schools-reaching as it does to nearly a11 the 
youth of the land-is unprecedented in China's history. The schools are used 
for two purposes: first, to assure a population with basic literacy combined 
with practical experience at work, and a small number of highly trained 
specialists in the technical subjects relevant to China's modernization; second, 
to indoctrinate the population from kindergarten up with a common social 
and political creed built upon the teaching of Marxism-Leninism as inter- 
preted by Mao Tse-tung. The school system was rocked to its foundations 
by Mao's effort to make the schools more political, more continuously "revo- 
lutionary," but the recent trend is back towards a balance between the two 
functions of imparting knowIedge and indoctrination. The government is 
unambiguous in its pronouncements on this point, and the Party workers see 
to its implementation at all levels. 
Here is a classic statement of the point by the Minister of Education: 
We insist that education must be in the service of proletarian polltics and that all 
undertakings must be combined wlth political thought, because only in this way can 
we train the type of personnel who are both red and expert. . . . the soul of all school 
work [is] the political education of Marxism-Leninlsm and the political task of the 
Party." 
Underlying this policy of intensive education-indoctrination, and underlying 
the vast propaganda apparatus we shall turn to next, is an assumption that 
we found in the ideology of imperial China: Man can, by the guidance and 
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example of his superiors, be changed for the better. This old belief is held 
with more fervor in the People's RepubIic than it everwas before or, I believe, 
than it ever has been in the history of any people anywhere. What other 
regime in world history, having captured the last "Baby emperor" of China 
who had then served as a puppet emperor of the Japanese in Manchukuo, 
would proceed to devote years to re-educating him, to changing his outlook, 
thought patterns, etc., so that he finally lived out his life as a gardenFr in 
Peking and wrote his memoirs! And if-as seems very probable-the Chinese 
Communist revolution cost far fewer lives than the successive phases of the 
Russian, this can be attributable, in part, to this belief in man's capacity for 
being changed for the better. 
The propaganda apparatus, by which Peking augments the effectiveness 
of both the state system of transmitting orders and the educational network, 
is truly formidable. Though it draws certain techniques from the Russian 
system of agit-prop, it is both fueled and colored by many of the age-old 
assumptions we have discussed, not the least of which is the idea of the per- 
fectibility of man. There is neither time, nor indeed much utility, in discussing 
the formal structure of the propaganda apparatus. We can only take up 
certain aspects, and these we shall try to relate where possible to underlying 
assumptions persisting from the past. 
The Party workers, or cadres, who carry on this program are committed 
to one body of doctrine-Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Mao. They, 
in time, master great sections of the Selected Works of Ma0 Tse-tung and 
use them in their upper level propaganda. Here is surely something that 
resembles the old belief in a single authoritative body ofwriting (the Classics) 
and in an elite which could spread and itselftransmit messages to others-with 
net gain to the recipient and to the society as a whole. But the Selected 
Works, like the Classics before them, were too complex for ordinary people. 
Hence one finds, in the People's Republic as in the Empire, a variety of 
short texts, pithy digests of the same authoritative truths but meant for 
mass consumption. In earlier years Liu Shao-ch'i's How to he rr Good 
Com~nzinist served some of this purpose, and more recently Mao's Yii-lu, 
or "Sayings" (the little red book) has been used not only as a handbook 
of Maoist wisdom but as a religious amulet. We should note in passing 
that the title of the book is the same as that of the collected sayings of 
the twelfth-century reformulator of neo-Confucianism, Chu Hsi, and that 
that title was in turn a calculated echo of the title of Confucius's Lun-yii 
(Analects), the old-st and most venerated of Confucian texts. In one province 
with a population of 21 million, Mao's writings are said to have sold a 
hundred million copies!" Every school, every commune, every factory 
has its periods devoted to the study of Mao's thought. Perhaps this is enough 
to show that respect for the written word, and the written word of a 
constituted authority, has not disappeared from the Chinese scene. 
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Slogans constitute perhaps the ultimate in simplification of verbal propa- 
ganda. In new China, as in the old, slogans are used as reminders or as pithy 
communications to the barely literate. I remarked earlier that in imperial 
China rebels made particular use of slogans because their potential audience 
was barely literate, if that. But they were more widely used. I remember living 
as an "enemy alien" in Japanese-occupied Peking. If I went out in the morn- 
ing I would often see written on a house wall the slogan Huan-wo shan-shui, 
"Give us back our mountains and our riversM-a phrase coined by a military 
hero who resisted invaders in the twelfth century." The Japanese would have 
it rubbed out, and a day or two Iater it would be back again. Visitors to today's 
China report the wide use of slogans, many spread across the fronts of build- 
ings or on walls. The most common are salutes to the nation's leader, for 
example: "Long live our great teacher, leader, commander and helmsman 
Chairman Mao." But others are meant to be spurs to action. For example: 
"Learn from Ta-chai," which is a model commune. "Hold the spirit of Yenan 
forever bright," which is a reminder to keep up the revolutionary drive and 
self-sacrifice that characterized the Communist Party's long struggle for 
power. Still another type is the shorthand reference in the form of a slogan 
to one nation-wide campaign or another. For example i-ta san-fnrz, "one 
crush, three oppose," which refers to the campaign to crush counter-revolu- 
tion and oppose: 1) corruption and graft, 2) speculation, 3) waste. 
But books, even simple books, and words, even in the form of slogans, do 
not reach all people at all levels of awareness and literacy. One of the devices 
most widely used in propaganda is example-the holding up before ordinary 
folk of models who acted according to all the Maoist imperatives, put country 
before self, sacrificed then~selves for their fellow workers, overfulfilled their 
production quotas and so forth. Capsule biographies of these heroes and 
heroines are printed in the local papers and broadcast on the national radio, 
and photographs are widely distributed showing them receiving the personal 
congratulations of Chairman Mao. Then, in some cases, the local party 
workers will call people's attention to one of these figures and start a program 
to "emulate (or learn from) Comrade so and so." This is far, far more intensive 
and far-reaching than anything in the old order, but we found in that order 
a deeply held belief in the power of example, and the practice of public 
rewards and public celebrations honor~ng those who had learned a Classic 
well or came out first in the state examinations. The use of example as propa- 
ganda is then another continuity from imperial to the People's China. 
In imperial China, the governing class was constantly concerned with the 
songs people sang in the fields-whether they were properly elevated in tone 
or possibly subversive. Dramatic troupes which toured the cities and coun- 
tryside were closely watched for the same reason. But the Chinese Communist 
Party in its propaganda operations takes a somewhat different view of such 
things. It destroyed many of the traditional forms of drama because they were 
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seen as subversive, i.e., perpetuating nostalgia for the past. But it went on 
to harness music, ballet, drama, and cinema to the revolutionary purpose. 
The new tunes do not strike us as remarkable, but the message is clear: "The 
East is Red," "Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman." Eight approved 
ballet-dramas, each with its revolutionary message, have criss-crossed the 
land, and travelling drama-groups have gone on tour to the villages. It is 
estimated that one of the ballet-dramas, "Red Detachment of Women," has 
been seen by five hundred milIion people (including President Nixon). The 
cinema fare, with goodies and baddies (counter-revolutionaries) much like 
our westerns, has a yearly audience of four billion.'' 
Much more could be said, but I hope I have convinced you that certain 
assumptions and beliefs regarding human behavior and ways to influence 
it have continued from the Confucian imperial order into the Communist 
People's Republic of China. I hope too that I have dissipated any lingering 
beliefs that The People's Republic is a police state where people are held 
in line by the massive use of force and terror. The psychological means of 
control I have described are far more effective, far less costly than the use 
of brute force would ever be. 
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